

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 MBFR-03 ADP-00 IO-12 OIC-04 AEC-11 ACDA-19

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NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 SAJ-01

H-02 NSC-10 SS-15 RSR-01 /155 W
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P R 112225 Z MAY 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0077

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2951

USNMR SHAPE

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

USDEL SALT TWO

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 2345

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: MAY 11 NAC ON U. S. APPROACH

HELSINKI FOR USDEL MPT

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

SUMMARY: FIRST INSTRUCTED NAC REVIEW OF " THE U. S. APPROACH
TO MBFR" REVEALED BROAD SUPPORT FOR UNDERLYING U. S. PRINCIPLES.
MOST SPECIFICALLY FAVORED LIMITING OBJECTIVES FOR FIRST PHASE
OF MBFR, AVOIDING BINDING COMMITMENTS TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS,
AND APPLYING TEN PERCENT CRITERION AS MAXIMUM OVERALL REDUCTION
IN ALLIED FORCES. PERMREPS FOUND NO FAULT IN EMPHASIS ON
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STATIONED FORCES IN FIRST REDUCTION OPTION (COMMON CEILING).
BELGIAN AND GREEK PERMREPS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT
APPARENT BILATERALISM IN SECOND REDUCTION OPTION (PERCENTAGE/
PARITY), WHILE ITALY GREETED APPROACH WITH FAVOR, AND NETHERLANDS

PERMREP GAVE VIEW THAT SECOND APPROACH WOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID BILATERAL IMPLICATIONS. NETHERLANDS ALSO SUPPORTED THIRD APPROACH, BUT ITALY, GREECE, TURKEY, AND LUXEMBOURG HAD SOME INITIAL RESERVATIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE MBFR LIMITATIONS ON " FORWARD- BASED SYSTEMS." DRAWING ON QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REVIEWED IN WASHINGTON, RUMSFELD DISPELLED MIS-IMPRESSIONS OF SEVERAL PERMREPS ON SPECIFIC POINTS IN PAPER. U. S. RESERVATIONS ABOUT CONSTRAINTS BEYOND MBFR ZONE, HOWEVER, BROUGHT AN OPEN REJOINDER FROM NORWAY AND NETHERLANDS, AND VEILED ONE FROM GREECE TO EFFECT THAT " UNDIMINISHED SECURITY" FOR ALLIES MIGHT NECESSITATE SPECIFIC NON- CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES AKIN TO CONSTRAINTS IN AREAS BEYOND REDUCTION ZONE. SEVERAL PERMREPS ADVOCATED CAREFUL PREPARATION OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION ON ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR FOR JUNE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. NAC COMMISSIONED SPC TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK DRAFTING OF MBFR REPORT TO MINISTERS, USING GUIDELINES IN U. S. PAPER AS A BASIS. END SUMMARY.

1. ACTING SYG PANSA OPENED DISCUSSION OF U. S. PAPER AND CALLED FOR VIEWS ON WORK PROGRAM UP TO JUNE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. HE SAID IT HAD BEEN AGREED AT LAST PERMREPS LUNCH THAT COUNCIL WOULD FOR THE TIME BEING MAINTAIN FULL CONTROL OF REVIEW OF PAPER, AND THAT GUIDELINES ALONG LINES OF SECTION V OF THE INTRODUCTION TO U. S. PAPER SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR MINISTERS. PANSA SAID PERMREPS HAD ALSO AGREED THAT SENIOR POLADS MIGHT BEGIN NEXT WEEK TO PREPARE FIRST DRAFT OF A REPORT TO MINISTERS, WHICH COUNCIL COULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING WEEK.

2. KRAPF (FRG) GAVE AND CIRCULATED INSTRUCTED STATEMENT ON U. S. PAPER (TEXT SEPTEL). STATEMENT IDENTIFIED SERIES OF U. S. POINTS WITH WHICH FRG AGREED AND WISHED TO EMPHASIZE. KRAPF ENDED WITH OBSERVATION THAT EUROPEANS PROBABLY MORE AWARE THAN U. S. OF POLITICAL DANGERS IN OPENING AVENUES FOR OTHER SIDE TO EXERT INFLUENCE AMONG ALLIES, AND STRESSED AVOIDANCE OF A GEOGRAPHICALLY LIMITED ARMS CONTROL ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

3. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) PRAISED U. S. PAPER, IN PARTICULAR
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GUIDELINES SECTION. HE NOTED MBFR QUESTIONS IN PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT, AND WONDERED IF U. S. HAD ANSWERED THESE QUESTIONS TO ITS OWN SATISFACTION. WITH REGARD TO SECOND U. S. APPROACH, HE WISHED TO WARN COUNCIL OF DANGERS IN U. S./ SOVIET BILATERALISM AND IN ANYHRETREAT FROM CONCEPT THAT MBFR IS A " EUROPEAN" PROCESS. DE STAERCKE REPORTED THAT JCS CHAIRMAN MOORER HAD TOLD HIM DURING SHAPEX THAT FIRST U. S. APPROACH HAD BEEN DRAWN UP WITH ASSISTANCE OF COMPUTERS. TO WHAT EXTENT HAD HUMAN JUDGMENT BEEN APPLIED AFTERWARDS? HE SAID HE WOULD LEAVE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO EXPERTS. (DE STAERCKE COMMENTED LATER THAT BELGIUM HAS ONLY ONE MBFR EXPRT, WHO IS NOW IN VIENNA -- I. E., WILLOT.)

4. PACK (UK) ECHOED FRG CONCERN THAT MBFR TIMETABLE NOT " GET OUT OF HAND" IN SUCH A WAY THAT ALLIES WOULD BE FORCED TO ACCEPT UNSATISFACTORY COMPROMISE IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT MBFR SHOULD NOT RESULT IN A ZONE OF DISCRIMINATION. SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, HE WELCOMED U. S. PAPER AND SUPPORTED EMPHASIS ON MAXIMUM SOVIET REDUCTIONS, BUT CAUTIONED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP TACTICS FOR GETTING LARGER SOVIET REDUCTIONS THAN ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO TAKE. UK PARTICULARLY SUPPORTS IDEA OF PARITY WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM BOTH OF THE FIRST TWO U. S. APPROACHES.

5. PECK SAID MILITARY ADVICE ON U. S. OPTIONS SHOULD BE SOUGHT AS WELL AS POLITICAL REVIEW. USE OF MILITARY COMMITTEE MIGHT BE TOO CUMBERSOME. BEST PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOR WORKING GROUP TO GIVE TECHNICAL ADVICE WHEN REQUESTED, AND FOR SACEUR TO CARRY OUT SOME SORT OF MILITARY ASSESSMENT.

6. PECK STRESSED NEED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY CITING EXTENSIVE LEAKS IN VIENNA. (HE LATER OBSERVED, HALF IN JEST, THAT FACT THAT THERE WERE THREE OPTIONS WAS ALREADY PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, AND THAT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO MOUNT A PUBLIC DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN, FOR EXAMPLE BY MENTIONING A LARGER NUMBER OF OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION.)

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OMB-01 TRSE-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 SAJ-01

H-02 NSC-10 SS-15 RSR-01 /155 W

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P R 112225 Z MAY 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2951

USNMR SHAPE

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

USDEL SALT TWO

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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HELSINKI FOR USDEL MPT
VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

7. PECK SAID ALLIES WOULD ALSO NEED CONSIDER NEGOTIABILITY OF OPTIONS. SOVIET INITIATIVES SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED, AND TACTICS DEVELOPED TO DEAL WITH THEM. HE CITED HUNGARIAN ISSUE AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW NOT TO NEGOTIATE. ALLIES SHOULD DRAW LESSONS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE, AND FIND WAYS TO AVOID HAVING THE SOVIETS " SELL US THE SAME HORSE TWICE."

8. MENZIES (CANADA) SUPPORTED U. S. VIEW THAT INITIAL MBFR OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE LIMITED, BUT SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE FURTHER STEPS. HE THEN COMMENTED ON SPECIFIC GUIDELINES IN PART V OF U. S. INTRODUCTION. HE CONCURRED WITH NEED TO MAINTAIN
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UNDIMINISHED SECURITY BUT THOUGHT THAT MENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT MBFR COULD ENHANCE SECURITY COULD MISLEAD WESTERN PUBLICS; HE THOUGHT THE LIMIT OF WESTERN REDUCTIONS TO 10 PERCENT WAS REASONABLE; HE CONCURRED THAT PRE- REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WERE NOT ESSENTIAL, BUT BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE POLITICALLY DESIRABLE; HE THOUGHT THAT THE GUIDELINE ON PHASING NEEDED AMPLIFICATION. HE DOUBTED ALLIES COULD AGREE ON ONE OPTION BY MINISTERIAL MEETING SINCE THEY WOULD WISH MORE TIME ASSESS IMPLICATIONS. IT APPEARED TO HIM THAT U. S. HAD ALREADY GIVEN OPTIONS IN OUTLINE FORM TO PUBLIC. THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A CAREFUL PUBLIC EXPPOSITION OF ALLIED MBFR OBJECTIVES AT TIME OF COPENHAGEN MINISTERIAL; WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT MBFR SHOULD NOT BE MERELY THE RESULT OF A LAST- MINUTE, LATE- NIGHT DRAFTING JOB.

9. RUMSFELD (U. S.) ASKED FOR FLOOR TO RESPOND TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS. WITH RESPECT TO MENZIES IMPRESSION THAT OPTIONS HAD BEEN PUBLICIZED, HE SAID THAT ACTUAL TEXT OF PRESIDENT' S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT AND ACCOMPANYING REMARKS BY DR. KISSINGER SHOULD REASSURE ALLIES ON THIS POINT AND PROMISED TO CIRCULATE PERTINENT EXTRACTS. (THIS WAS DONE BY LETTER ON AFTERNOON OF MAY 11.) WITH REGARD TO DE STAERCKE' S CONCERN ABOUT SECOND APPROACH, U. S. HAD RECOGNIZED IN PRESENTING PAPER THAT EACH APPROACH HAS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES. TASK OF COUNCIL IS TO WEIGH THESE PROS AND CONS WITH RESPECT TO OUTCOMES. OTHERS HAD MENTIONED QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS; HOW EACH OPTION SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED SHOULD BE LEFT UNTIL AFTER COUNCIL HAD DECIDED ON PREFERRED OUTCOMES.

10. BETTINI (ITALY) TOOK ISSUE WITH DE STAERCKE ON DANGERS IN SECOND OPTION, WHICH IN ITALIAN VIEW HAD CERTAIN ADVANTAGES AS A FIRST PHASE. HOWEVER, FIRST OPTION WOULD ALSO MEET ITALIAN INTERESTS IN EMPHASIZING STATIONED FORCES. THIRD OPTION CONTAINED SOME SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES FOR ITALY, BECAUSE IT

APPEARED TO INTRODUCE FBS INTO MBFR.

11. CHORAFAS (GREECE) APPRECIATED U. S. RECOGNITION OF NEED FOR STRONG DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND MAINTENANCE OF ADEQUATE U. S. PRESENCE IN EUROPE. GREEKS DO NOT OBJECT TO NEED FOR GREATER BURDEN- SHARING EFFORTS IN CONNECTION WITH MBFR. HE SUPPORTED DE STAERCKE'S PREFERENCE FOR FIRST U. S. OPTION,
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WHICH SPECIFICALLY ENVISAGED INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS. LIKE ITALY, GREEKS ARE NOT HAPPY WITH THIRD OPTION. U. S. GUIDELINES SEEMED GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, BUT GREECE MIGHT HAVE RESERVATIONS ON THIRD AND FOURTH GUIDELINES AND WOULD WITHHOLD COMMENT FOR TIME BEING.

12. HOSTERT (LUXEMBOURG) COMPLEMENTED U. S. ON MANNER OF PRESENTING PAPER, WHICH ALLOWED FOR ALL ALLIES TO GIVE VIEWS BEFORE U. S. REFINES ITS OWN. HE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THIRD OPTION WHICH SEEMED TO GIVE ADVANTAGE TO EAST BY EQUATING ONE NUCLEAR WARHEAD TO ONLY 1-1/2 TANKS.

13. OBSERVING THAT NEW DUTCH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SWORN IN ONLY LATER IN DAY ON MAY 11, SPIERENBURG (NETHERLANDS) SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE NATURALLY NOT FINAL. SOME OF U. S. FIGURES DID NOT SEEM TO CONFORM WITH THOSE BEING USED BY MBFR WORKING GROUP, AND DUTCH WOULD LIKE DISCREPANCIES EXPLAINED. HE WELCOMED MIXED PACKAGES AS A POSSIBILITY, BUT THOUGHT MBFR SHOULD BE LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES AT THE OUTSET. ALTHOUGH NETHERLANDS HAD PREVIOUSLY STRONGLY FAVORED PRE- REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS, HE SAW SIGNS THAT NEW GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE MORE SENSITIVE TO U. S. ARGUMENTATION ON THIS POINT. HE AGREED WITH DE STAERCKE THAT THERE WAS A DANGER IN US/ SOVIET BILATERAL REDUCTIONS, BUT BILATERAL APPEARANCE COULD BE AVOIDED IF EACH SIDE AGREED TO CERTAIN REDUCTIONS IN STATIONED FORCES, THEN LEFT IT TO THE TWO ALLIANCES TO DECIDE AMONG THEMSELVES WHICH STATIONED FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED. SPIERENBURG SAID HE EXPECTED FURTHER, MORE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS FOR WEEK OF MAY 21.

14. HJORTH- NIELSEN (DENMARK) SUPPORTED U. S. CONCEPT OF LIMITING OBJECTIVES AND AVOIDING OPEN- ENDED MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. U. S. APPROACH WAS CONSISTENT WITH DENMARK'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN CURRENT MBFR PHASE, THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE REDUCTION ZONE, AND THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF REDUCING DANISH FORCES. (SEVERAL PERMREPS SMILED AT THIS REMARK.) DENMARK ALSO SHARED VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FIRM COMMITMENT TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS AFTER A FIRST PHASE OF MBFR. HJORTH- NIELSEN ACCEPTED CONCEPT OF LIMITING CONSTRAINTS TO REDUCTION ZONE FOR TIME BEING, BUT WONDERED HOW CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES, SINCE CONTRAINTS MENTIONED IN U. S. PAPER SEEMED TO
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BE LARGELY THE SAME AS THOSE BEING DISCUSSED IN CSCE. DENMARK
DID NOT RULE OUT THE EVENTUAL INCLUSION OF ITS TERRITORY IN
SUCH MBFR MEASURES.

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ACTION EUR-25

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OMB-01 TRSE-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 SAJ-01

H-02 NSC-10 SS-15 RSR-01 /155 W

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P R 112225 Z MAY 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0079

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2953

USNMR SHAPE

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

USDEL SALT TWO

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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HELSINKI FOR USDEL MPT

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

15. ERALP (TURKEY) HAD NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS, BUT
CONCURRED WITH U. S. STRESS ON LIMITING NEGOTIATIONS TO CENTRAL
EUROPE; TURKEY WOULD BE " RELUCTANT" TO CONSIDER ANY CONSTRAINTS
ON ITS OWN TERRITORY. HE SHARED DE STAERCKE' S
RESERVATIONS WITH REGARD TO SECOND OPTION AND CONCERNS OF OTHERS
ABOUT FBS IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD OPTION.

16. RUMSFELD AGAIN ASKED DSYG FOR FLOOR TO COMMENT ON POINTS
RAISED IN DISCUSSION, DRAWING ON QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN USNATO
2133 LIMDIS NOTAL, AS REFINED IN STATE 88728.

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17. SEVERAL PERMREPS HAD REMARKED ON U. S. EMPHASIS ON STATIONED FORCES TO STATE THAT THE U. S. OPPOSED REDUCTIONS IN INDIGENOUS FORCES, WOULD BE PUTTING IT TOO STRONGLY. HOWEVER, U. S. CONSIDERS THEM UNWISE, PARTICULARLY AS A FIRST STEP. OUR VIEWS ARE NOT CLOSED, AND WE WANT TO HEAR FULL ALLIED REACTIONS, BUT WE BELIEVE THE FIRST STAGE SHOULD BE CONFINED TO STATIONED FORCES.

18. WITH REGARD TO MIXED PACKAGE OPTION AND POSSIBLE OVERLAP BETWEEN MBFR AND SALT, RUMSFELD SAID U. S. HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE PROPOSITION THAT OUR " FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS" WOULD BE LIMITED IN SALT. THE PROPOSED REDUCTION OUTCOMES ARE VIEWED SOLELY IN THE CONTEXT OF MBFR.

19. ON QUESTION WHETHER U. S. OPTIONS COULD BE MODIFIED OR COMBINED, U. S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN WHATEVER SUGGESTIONS THE ALLIES MAY HAVE. WE WOULD WANT THEM TO MEET THE SAME TESTS THAT THE U. S. PROPOSAL DO, I. E., THAT THEY ADDRESS BASIS SECURITY CONCEPTS SUCH AS PARITY, MORE DEFENSIVELY ORIENTED POSTURES AND STABILITY. THUS MBFR PROPOSALS CANNOT HAVE AN ARBITRARY BASIS. AGAIN, HOWEVER, WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF FOCUSING ON WHAT THE ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT, ON ACCEPTABLE OUTCOMES. OBVIOUSLY, WE MIGHT, IN DEVELOPING A NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL, WANT TO COMBINE AND MAKE CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES. BUT WE SHOULD BE CLEAR BEFOREHAND ON WHAT KINDS OF OUTCOMES WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AND WE WANT TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON THAT SUBJECT FOR THE PRESENT.

20. FRG CONCERN WITH PHASING WAS ADDRESSED IN ALL OF U. S. APPROACHES. THE COMMON CEILING OPTION INVOLVES THE STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS PHASE. THE PERCENTAGE/ PARITY OPTION COULD INVOLVE IMPLEMENTATION IN SEPARATE STAGES. THE MIXED PACKAGE COULD BE AN ADD- ON. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE TACTICAL ISSUE OF CONSTRUCTING A NEGOTIATING APPROACH INVOLVING PHASING. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE ALLIES IN DOING SO ONCE WE ARE CLEAR AS TO THE OUTCOMES AGREEABLE TO THE ALLIES.

21. ON THE U. S. ATTITUDE TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT WITH CONSTRAINTS IN A WIDER AREA THAN THE REDUCTION ZONE, RUMSFELD RECALLED THAT U. S. GUIDELINES STATED THAT THE ALLIED APPROACH
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SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED. THE COUNCIL HAS AGREED THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK NON- CIRCUMVENTION IN HUNGARY IN NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS BY THE ALLIES FOR CONSTRAINTS BEYOND THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD BE LIKELY TO LEAD TO EASTERN COUNTER- PROPOSALS FOR CONSTRAINTS IN A WIDER AREA ON THE NATO SIDE. THIS WOULD BROADEN THE SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND THE AGREED FOCUS OF CENTRAL EUROPE, AND MIGHT BE PREJUDICIAL TO

ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS. THE U. S. CANNOT SUPPORT MEASURES WHICH WOULD EXPAND THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA FOR MBFR BEYOND CENTRAL EUROPE. THE CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE ALLIES, WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO APPLY TO ALL STATES PARTICIPATING IN CSCE, MAY ALSO SERVE TO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE IN AREAS NOT DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY MBFR AGREEMENTS.

22. RE REASON FOR LIMITING REDUCTIONS TO TEN PERCENT, U. S. CRITERION IS UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR NATO. WE BELIEVE THAT MBFR MEASURES SHOULD NOT BE OF SUCH SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE AS TO IMPAIR THE ALLIES' ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT NATO'S STRATEGY. ASSUMING PACT AGREEMENT TO SATISFACTORY REDUCTIONS, OUR BENCHMARK FOR REDUCTIONS OF ALLIED STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS GROUND FORCES IS NOT MORE THAN 10 PERCENT OF EACH.

23. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING CATEGORIZATION OF NON- US FORCES AS STATIONED FORCES, RUMSFELD EXPLAINED THAT WE USED THE CONVENTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES, AS GENERALLY USED IN NATO MBFR STUDIES UP TO THE PRESENT: THAT STATIONED FORCES ARE THOSE DEPLOYED BY ONE COUNTRY ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER COUNTRY. WE ARE CERTAINLY WILLING TO EXAMINE THE APPLICATION OF OTHER COUNTRY. WE ARE CERTAINLY WILLING TO EXAMINE THE APPLICATION OF OTHER DEFINITIONS. BUT WE WOULD NOTE THAT THE DEFINITIONS ARE ONLY RELEVANT TO THE REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST U. S. APPROACH SINCE THE OTHERS CONCERN ONLYHU. S. AND SOVIET FORCES.

24. IN RESPONSE TO DANISH PERMREP'S REMARK THAT CONSTRAINTS INCLUDED IN U. S. PAPER WERE ALMOST IDENTICAL TO CBMS IN CSCE, RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT THERE WERE AT LEAST THREE DIFFERENCES:

A) PRE- REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO THE
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NATO GUIDELINES AREA, WHILE CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES WOULD APPLY TO ALL PARTICIPANTS IN A CSCE;

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OMB-01 TRSE-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 SAJ-01

H-02 NSC-10 SS-15 RSR-01 /155 W

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P R 112225 Z MAY 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0080
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2954
USNMR SHAPE
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USCINCEUR
USDEL SALT TWO
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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B) PRE- REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE STRINGENT AND COMPLEX THAN CMB' S. THEY ALSO INCLUDE AN ADDITIONAL AND MORE RESTRICTIVE MEASURE, " LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATION, NUMBER, AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES, AND,

C) PRE- REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS COULD DIRECTLY STRENGTHEN THE CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

25. MC CHAIRMAN STEINHOFF SAID SHAPE AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF WERE ALREADY AT WORK ON ANALYSIS OF U. S. PAPER AND WOULD WELCOME DISCUSSION WITH U. S. EXPERTS. ALTHOUGH MILITARY COMMITTEE HAD NOT YET DISCUSSED PAPER, HE COULD STATE THAT BOTH HE AND SACEUR STRONGLY AGREED ON NEED FOR UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, NEED FOR RESTRICTING SIZE OF REDUCTIONS
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IN ALLIED FORCES, AND DESIRABILITY OF ASSURING REDUCTIONS THAT WOULD BE NUMERICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO NATO. HE BELIEVED MILREPS WOULD SHARE THESE VIEWS.

26. KRISTVIK (NORWAY) LACKED INSTRUCTIONS BUT SAID HE COULD STATE THAT NORWAY DID NOT COMPLETELY AGREE WITH VIEW GIVEN BY RUMSFELD THAT CONSTRAINTS SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED BEYOND REDUCTION AREAS. CONSTRAINTS OUTSIDE REDUCTION ZONE MIGHT WELL BE IN ALLIED INTEREST, EVEN NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT AND TO ASSURE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED.

27. SPIERENBURG INTERVENED AGAIN TO SUPPORT KRISTVIK. HE DID NOT SEE HOW ALLIES COULD ASSURE NON- CIRCUMVENTION WITHOUT CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS. MOREOVER, WITH REGARD TO TURKISH POINT, HE DID NOT SEE HOW FLANK COUNTRIES COULD EXPECT TO PRECLUDE A BUILD- UP OF SOVIET FORCES IN TERRITORIES CONFRONTING THEIR OWN BORDERS WITHOUT THEMSELVES ACCEPTING CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS. GREEK REP COMMENTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS NOT OPPOSED TO

CONSTRAINTS ON STATIONED FORCES.

28. NAC DISCUSSION OF WORK PROGRAM AND PREPARATION OF REPORT
TO MINISTERS FOLLOWED, AND IS REPORTED SEPTEL.
RUMSFELD

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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
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Disposition Remarks:
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
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EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

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Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: MAY 11 NAC ON U. S. APPROACH
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USNMR SHAPE
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USCINCEUR
SALT TWO

HELSINKI
VIENNA
MOSCOW

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005